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DIVERSITY IN THE AGE OF TERROR:
How RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN




Racial and ethnic diversity in the intelligence community en-
hances U.S. national security. But a history of homogeneity in the
intelligence community has undermined national security. The failure
to maximize the benefits of a pluralistic population led to a dearth of
diverse intelligence personnel that helped account for the failure to
fully understand the al-Qaeda threat. The post-9/11 Intelligence Re-
form Act of 2004, which for the first time statutorily mandated efforts
to diversify the intelligence community, was a significant step in reme-
dying the lack of diversity in the intelligence community. Nevertheless,
the intelligence committee needs to undertake further steps including
continuing congressional oversight and race-related bona fide occupa-
tional qualifications to overcome a history of exclusion in the
intelligence community. Despite incremental progress, the efforts to di-
versify the intelligence community must continue to attain both
security and equality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. intelligence community may well be the last federal
bastion to be racially and ethnically diversified,' spurred in part by its
1. See Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security
Agency: Minority Hire, Retentions and Promotions: Hearing Before the House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103rd Cong. 1 (1994) (statement of Rep. Glickman, Chair,
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence) (declaring that "[plublic scrutiny of the
intelligence community's commitment to equal employment opportunity and work force
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failure to warn against al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Prior to 9/11, Robert Callum presciently wrote about
the need for diversity in the intelligence community. Callum explained,
"Either the IC [intelligence community] will embrace diversity on its
own, or it will find change thrust upon it in the wake of failure."2 Fail-
ure occurred on 9/11 and forced change upon the intelligence
community by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of
2004.3 A portion of the changes in the 2004 Act includes the prescrip-
tion to ethnically and culturally diversify the intelligence agencies.4
Legislation diversifying the intelligence community was long
overdue because for decades, the "hidden handicap" due to the lack of
homogeneity within the intelligence community made the legislation
diversifying the intelligence community necessary.5 In order to address
this "hidden handicap," this article focuses on the people within the
intelligence organizations. Because the post-9/11 U.S. intelligence com-
munity is a modern-day behemoth it is easy to overlook the people
within the organization. For example, the intelligence community is
comprised of the following seventeen agencies: (1) the Office of the Di-
rector of National Intelligence (ODNI); (2) the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA); (3) the National Security Agency (NSA); (4) the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA); (5) the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI); (6) the National Reconnaissance Office; (7) the National Geos-
patial-Intelligence Agency; (8) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
of the State Department; the intelligence elements of the four military
services consisting of the (9) Army, (10) Navy, (11) Marine Corps, and
(12) Air Force; and intelligence components of the (13) Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, (14) Department of Energy, (15) Department of
Treasury, (16) Department of Homeland Security, and (17) Coast
Guard.6 The intelligence community creates a huge bureaucracy that
continues to distend," but the people within this ever-expanding colos-
diversity has been virtually nonexistent due to classification and security concerns") (the
hearing was held Oct. 28, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 House Hearing].
2. Robert Callum, The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence Community, 14
INT'L J. INTELL. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 25, 39 (2001) (emphasis added).
3. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. and other titles)
[hereinafter Intelligence Reform Act].
4. Id. at § 1011(f)(3)(A)(iv), 118 Stat. at 3649 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(f)(3)(A)(iv)
(2006)).
5. Callum, supra note 2, at 34.
6. JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 12 (5th ed. 2008).
7. Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing
Beyond Control, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, available at: http://projects.washingtonpost.
com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/.
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sus should not be forgotten. As stated by Representative Norm Dicks of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: "People are at
the forefront of all advances in technology, intelligence operations, and
analysis."8
The emphasis on the importance of the people within the intelli-
gence community leads to the second focus of this article - a focus on
ethnic, cultural, and racial diversity - rather than gender, age, or
other types of diversity).9 "Ethnicity" means "a 'sense of peoplehood,'
and the racial, linguistic, religious and other cultural traits that con-
tribute to that sense."10 "Culture" is defined as "a group's values,
standards, and beliefs."" "Race" is characterized as "a human group
that defines itself and/or is defined by other groups as different from
other groups by virtue of innate and immutable physical characteris-
tics." 12 However, "race" is an oft-debated term. For example, Professor
Sharona Hoffman argues "race" is an "incoherent term" that should be
replaced with terms such as "color," "continent of origin," or "national
origin."13 Due to the ubiquitousness of the term, this article will in-
clude the usage of "race."
Third, this article focuses on two primary activities that intelli-
gence personnel engage in: (1) clandestine collection of non-public data
using human sources (as opposed to using technical sources such as
satellites), and (2) analysis of the collected data to turn into useful in-
telligence for policymakers. 1 4 The article focuses on these two activities
because they rely on people, and "people are the Intelligence Commu-
nity's most precious resource."15
The three foci above lead to this article's thesis that the intelli-
gence community's lack of diversity creates a hidden handicap that
8. 8 Diversity and Minority Hiring in Intelligence Agencies: Hearing Before the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong. 21 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Dicks, Member, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence) (the hearing was held Nov.
29, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 House Hearing].
9. 9 Gender, age, and other types of diversity are also significant, but the limited
scope of this article requires that they be addressed another time.
10. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 272 n.7 (1992).
11. David T. Moore & Lisa Krizan, Core Competencies for Intelligence Analysis at the
National Security Agency, in BRINGING INTELLIGENCE ABOUT 95, 121 (Russell G. Swenson
ed., 2003).
12. PIERCE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9
(1967).
13. Sharona Hoffman, Is there a Place for Race' as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J.
1093, 1100 (2004).
14. RICHELSON, supra note 6, at 2-3.
15. GREGORY F. TREVERTON & C. BRYAN GABBARD, ASSESSING THE TRADECRAFT OF
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIs 27 (2008).
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must be removed to enhance national security. This article explicates
this thesis in five parts. Part II reveals how the history of intelligence
community homogeneity led to this hidden handicap. Part III explains
why this homogeneity handicap must be removed. Part IV explores
how heterogeneity can be achieved. Part V examines insights that can
be drawn from the ongoing process of diversifying the intelligence
community.
II. THE LACK OF DIVERSITY IN THE PAST
Examining how the intelligence community historically fared in
minority hiring and retention is difficult because the intelligence com-
munity's workforce statistics are classified. Thus, one will encounter
difficulty when attempting to examine the intelligence community's
historical deficiency in hiring and retaining minorities.16 The U.S. in-
telligence community classifies the total workforce statistics of
agencies due to national security concerns.1" Despite this information
being classified, the intelligence community makes some hiring data
available, such as the percentage of racial minorities within the total
workforce.18 One may glean additional information from congressional
hearings, intelligence officials' memoirs, and other unclassified
sources. The data gathered shows slow progression in the diversifica-
tion of the intelligence community. This slow progress is charted
through the following periods: (1) Pearl Harbor and World War II, (2)
Post-World War II, and (3) 9/11 and the War on Terror. The first period
(Pearl Harbor and World War II) is marked by minimal, if any, pro-
gress in diversifying the intelligence community. The second period
(Post-World War II) is marked by an increasing awareness of the need
to diversify and burgeoning efforts to do so. The third period (9/11 and
the War on Terror) is marked by reform legislation expressly mandat-
ing diversity in the intelligence community and attempts to implement
this mandate.
16. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 1.
17. See generally NAT'L SEC. & INT'L AFFAIRS Div., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: PERSONNEL PRACTICES AT CIA, NSA, AND DIA COMPARED WITH
THOSE OF OTHER 10 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96006.pdf
[hereinafter Personnel Practices].
18. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 1.
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A. Pearl Harbor and World War II
1. The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI)
World War II was the crucible in which the modern U.S. intelli-
gence community emerged. 19 As war blazed in Europe, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt sent New York attorney William J. Donovan on
a fact-finding mission to London. He reported back on the need for a
centralized intelligence agency, and President Roosevelt in July 1941
established the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) with Dono-
van in charge to provide intelligence for the president. 2 01
Because diversity policies and other equal opportunity efforts in
the workplace did not exist at that time, the COI was not a paragon of
diversity. Also, the need to quickly staff the COI required Donovan to
recruit from those around him rather than from a broad demographic
base.2 1 As head of the Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Lumbard law firm,
he drew upon the resources of his firm.2 2 Thus, one of his close assist-
ants was his former law clerk working in the antitrust division of the
Justice Department. Another recruit was a friend, William Whitney, a
member of Oxford University and a barrister of Inner Temple. 23
2. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
Consequently, the Office of Coordinator of Information did not
endure. The December 1941 Japanese attack on U.S. naval forces in
Pearl Harbor marked the official entry of the United States into World
War II.24 The attack impelled the establishment of a larger and more
capable intelligence agency - America's first national intelligence
agency - the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).25 The OSS consisted
of a centralized intelligence agency incorporating multiple functions
including espionage, covert action, counterintelligence, and intelli-
gence analysis. 2 6 Again, with Donavan in charge, the OSS mirrored the
COI and lacked diversity. Although the OSS sought out those with lan-
19. See THOMAS F. TROY, DONOVAN AND THE CIA 1 (1984).
20. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The Rise and Fall of the CIA, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 122, 124 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2010).
21. TROY, supra note 19, at 78.
22. Id. at 77.
23. Id. at 78.
24. ANNI P. BAKER, AMERICAN SOLDIERS OVERSEAS: THE GLOBAL MILITARY PRESENCE 30
(2004).
25. RICHELSON, supra note 6, at 445.
26. Id. at 15-16.
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guage skills and knowledge of foreign cultures, the agency initially
recruited by word of mouth.2 7 Donovan and other OSS officials would
learn about potential recruits from friends or other OSS staffers and
recruit from this limited pool. Personal connection, not pluralism,
steered staffing choices in the early OSS.28
Arguably, the OSS attempted to diversify the agency. According
to CIA Director John M. Deutch during his 1995 congressional testi-
mony on minority hiring in the intelligence community, OSS Director
Donovan stated: "We took this seeming liability [racial and gender
equality] and made an asset of it."29 Furthermore, Director Deutch ex-
plained that Donovan realized the benefits of hiring racially and
ethnically diverse OSS agents.3ao For instance, the diverse agents could
utilize their understanding of the culture and psychology of the enemy
forces to better penetrate their defenses.31 Unfortunately, Director
Deutch did not provide written policies or workforce numbers demon-
strating the OSS methodology of employing minority agents. The lack
of supporting historical materials and the agency practice of hiring ac-
quaintances contradict the assertion of a diverse OSS.
B. Post-World War II
1. CIA inception and Ivy League Recruits
The end of World War II in 1945 ended the OSS, but Cold War
fears of Soviet domination and memories of Pearl Harbor rekindled
calls for a centralized intelligence organization. 32 Two years after
World War II, President Harry S. Truman signed the National Secur-
ity Act of 1947, which established the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). 3 3 The 1947 Act made the CIA director head of the intelligence
community and tasked the CIA with various duties including correlat-
ing, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence. 34 Like the COI and the
OSS, the nascent CIA developed a homogenous workforce. The CIA
27. AGOSTINO VON HASSELL, SIGRID MACRAE & SIMONE AMESKAMP, ALLIANCE OF
ENEMIES 116-17 (2006).
28. Id. at 116.
29. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 4 (author's comment for clarity).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. BOB GRAHAM & JEFF NUSSBAUM, INTELLIGENCE MATTERS: THE CIA, THE FBI, SAUDI
ARABIA, AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICAS WAR ON TERROR 15 (2004).
33. RICHELSON, supra note 6, at 16.
34. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(a),(d)(3), 61 Stat. 495, 497-
98 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(3) (2000)).
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lacked diversity because it recruited heavily from a narrow segment of
society - Ivy League college graduates. CIA Director William Colby,
who joined the fledgling CIA in 1950, described it as populated by pa-
triotic young men and women from the "finest Ivy League campuses
and with the most impeccable social and establishment backgrounds
. . .. "35 Senator Bob Graham, who chaired the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and co-chaired the House-Senate Joint Inquiry into the
intelligence community's 9/11 failures protested the same issue. As
stated by Sen. Graham: "[T]he CIA has historically recruited people
who can be categorized as 'White, male, and Yale."'3 6
Unsurprisingly, CIA Director Colby described the CIA as hav-
ing a "poor record with respect to minorities in regards to
promotions."37 Upon becoming CIA Director in 1973, Colby realized
that although the CIA "had some blacks in traditional service posi-
tions, their rarity at the professional level was one of the worst in
government."38 In one instance a CIA employee, who was a black wo-
man, spoke with Colby about her lack of promotion. Colby inquired on
the employee's behalf and was told she did not seem to try very hard to
obtain the more competitive position whereupon Colby insisted that a
training program be developed.39 After receiving proper training, the
employee received her promotion based on her ability.4 0
The CIA's lack of diversity continued into the 1980s. One re-
searcher's examination of Who's Who in America for 1982-84 showed
that of the seventy listed CIA employees, 93% had college or university
degrees, and of this number, 32% were from the Ivy League institu-
tions (Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Pennsylvania,
Princeton, and Yale). 41 Further, of the 32%, 86% were from three
schools - Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. 42 By recruiting heavily from
Ivy League institutions that historically excluded students of color,43
the CIA maintained a predominantly white workforce for most its
existence.
35. WILLIAM COLBY & PETER FORBATH, HONORABLE MEN: My LIFE IN THE CIA 77
(1978).
36. GRAHAM & NUSSBAUM, supra note 32, at 258 (alteration in original).
37. COLBY AND FORBATH, supra note 35, at 362-63.
38. Id. at 363.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The Socio-Educational Composition of the CIA Elite: A
Statistical Note, 19 J. Am. STUD. 421, 422-23 (1985).
42. Id.
43. William C. Kidder, Negative Action Versus Affirmative Action: Asian Pacific
Americans are Still Caught in the Crossfire, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 605, 610-620 (2006).
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Continuing recruitment inequity was joined by continuing pro-
motion inequity. As confirmed by Tyler Drumheller, who served in the
CIA during the 1980s and rose to the position of Chief of CIA Clandes-
tine Operations in Europe, the CIA continually failed to facilitate
career advancement for women and minority employees.44 The CIA
must "shake off its old boys' network image," Drumheller advised, and
he did his best to change the CIA by promoting subordinates who
looked and sounded different from him.4 5
2. Congressional Oversight and Increased Accountability
Significant progress in diversifying the intelligence community
began when Representative Louis Stokes in 1987 became chair of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.4 6 He was the first
African American to chair this committee, serving two years in the po-
sition.4 7 Stokes began his effort to diversify the intelligence community
by changing the all-white composition of the intelligence committee
staff when he placed the first African American in a key position on the
committee staff.48
Under Stokes's leadership, the House Committee on Intelli-
gence pushed for minority scholarship programs (Undergraduate
Training Programs) to be established within the intelligence agencies
to recruit students of color.49 Authorization to begin the program was
given to the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency
in 1987, to the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1988, and to the Na-
tional Imagery and Mapping Agency in 2000.50 Stokes and other
committee members also called on the various intelligence agency
heads to provide reports on minority underrepresentation, provide
plans to remedy minority underrepresentation, and appear before the
committee to testify about minority hiring and promotion. The goal
44. TYLER DRUMHELLER, ON THE BRINK: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF How THE WHITE
HOUSE COMPROMISED AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE 189(2006).
45. Id.
46. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 56 (statement of Rep. Lewis, Member, House
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
47. Hiring, Promotion, Retention and Overall Representation of Minorities, Women and
Disabled Persons Within the Intelligence Community: House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 103rd Cong. 7-8 (1995) (statement of Representative Stokes, former Chair,
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence) (the hearing was held on Sept. 20, 1994)
[hereinafter 1994 House Hearing].
48. Id. at 7.
49. 148 CONG. REC. H5441-04 (daily ed. July 24, 2002) (statement of Representative
Hastings) (2002 WL 1724308).
50. Id. at H5448-04.
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was to instill in the intelligence agencies the concept of equal employ-
ment opportunity as a "positive benefit" to the intelligence
community. 51
3. Enduring Inequality
Congressional oversight prodded the intelligence community to-
wards greater equality, but the diversification of the intelligence
community remained a work in progress in the 1990s and beyond. The
CIA's 1991 Glass Ceiling Study found that women and minority CIA
employees faced career advancement obstacles. Women and minorities
were concentrated in the lower grades and their promotion rates were
lower than white male employees. 5 2
Other intelligence agencies in addition to the CIA faced diver-
sity problems. From 1992 to 1994, the percentages of minorities in the
DIA, NSA, and CIA were below the percentages of minorities in the
federal workforce and civilian labor force. 53 The FBI also suffered from
minority underrepresentation during this period.54
The table below shows that minority employee numbers for the
FBI and NSA in 1993 were less than the U.S. workforce numbers.
Blacks Hispanics Asian Americans
U.S. workforce "just over"10%55  "just over" 8%56 2.9%57
FBI 5.0%58 6.0%5 1.6%60
NSA 9.0%61 1.2%62 0.9%63
51. H.R. REP. No. 100-591, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2469, 2478-79,
1988 WL 169806.
52. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of R. James Woolsey, Director,
Cent. Intelligence Agency).
53. Personnel Practices, supra note 17, at 23.
54. 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 93 (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation).




58. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 26 (statement of Robert Bryant, Asst.
Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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When compared with the Federal workforce numbers, the 1993
numbers below for the DIA, CIA, FBI, and NSA also show minority
employees being underrepresented.







The numbers above were disclosed by intelligence agency heads
in congressional hearings on diversity problems in the intelligence
field. Congressional inquiry revealed that workplace inequities in the
intelligence community were extensive and entrenched. In testimony
before Congress in 1993, DIA Director James R. Clapper recounted
meeting with longtime black DIA employees who voiced their struggle
against inherent inequities within the system.69 NSA Director J.M.
McConnell, also testifying before Congress in 1993, described the most-
senior ranks of the NSA as consisting of mostly white males.7 Repre-
sentative Norman Dicks declared that due to years of neglect and
insensitivity, the intelligence community's minority hiring and promo-
tion record was the worst in the federal government in 1993.71
Two years later in 1995, minority underrepresentation was still
a problem despite the increase of minority employees in the intelli-
gence community. As seen in the table below, the percentages of
minority employees in the intelligence agencies were still below the ci-




67. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 26 (statement of Robert M. Bryant, Asst.
Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
68. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Representative Glickman,
Chair, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
69. Id. at 9 (statement of James R. Clapper, Director, Def. Intelligence Agency).
Clapper was at different times director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, which became the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
He is currently Director of National Intelligence. Office of the Director of Nat'l Intelligence,
http://www.dni.gov/clapper-bio.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
70. Id. at 44 (statement of J.M. McConnell, Director, Nat'l Security Agency).
71. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 20 (statement of Representative Dicks,
Member, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
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vilian labor force percentage, except for the NSA's percentage which
increased from 11.0% in 1993 to 22.0% in 1995 to equal the Civilian
labor force percentage.
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE
VERSUS INTELLIGENCE PERCENTAGE OF MINORITY
AGENCIES EMPLOYEES





After decades of minority underrepresentation in the intelli-
gence community, workforce diversity guidelines for the intelligence
community were finally established in 1995 (by CIA Director
Deutch)' 7 But even after this helpful step was taken, inequality in the
intelligence community endured. In 1995, CIA Director Deutch stated
that minorities, especially Hispanic and Asian Pacific employees, re-
mained underrepresented in the CIA.78
Later George Tenet, CIA director from 1997 to 2004, became
versed on racial bias within the ranks of the CIA shortly after becom-
ing director when he attended a meeting called by black CIA
employees. As Tenet recounts: "One after another, black employees
rose to tell disturbing stories of how over the years they had been dis-
respected and treated as second-class citizens .... " Tenet described the
meeting as "several of the most eye-opening hours I spent during my
time at the CIA."79
CIA Director Tenet's candid acknowledgement of being sur-
prised by the presence and puissance of racial bias within the CIA is
emblematic of the greater incomprehension by policymakers and the
public of the inequality problem in the intelligence community. An
overlooked problem remains an unremedied problem, as was the case
72. Id. at 37 (statement of J.M. McConnell, Director, Nat'1 Security Agency).
73. Id. at 57 (statement of Kenneth A. Minihan, Director, Def. Intelligence Agency).
74. Id. at 113 (statement of Nora Slatkin, Exec. Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency).
75. Id. at 104 (statement of Robert Bryant, Asst. Director, Fed. Bureau of Intelligence).
76. Id. at 37 (statement of J.M. McConnell, Director, Nat'1 Security Agency).
77. Id. at 4 (statement of John M. Deutch, Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency).
78. Id. at 8.
79. GEORGE TENET & BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE
CIA 23 (2007).
60 Vol. 6:1:49
DIVERSITY IN THE AGE OF TERROR
during the Cold War period when policymakers and intelligence offi-
cials focused externally on the communist threat rather than
internally on racial inequality issues.80 Also, the secretive nature of
the intelligence field, where intelligence agencies deal with classified
information and engage in covert activities, further cloaked the pro-
tracted problem of racial inequality.8 1 Only belatedly was there an
awareness of how overcoming internal racial inequity helps defend
against external enemies. As Tenet stated in his 2007 memoir after
leaving the CIA: "We need demographic diversity and diversity of
thought . . . to penetrate our toughest targets around the world." 82 Re-
grettably, no U.S. intelligence agency possessed sufficient diversity to
penetrate al-Qaeda and prevent terrorists from attacking the United
States on September 11, 2001.
C. 9/11 and the War on Terror
1. The 9/11 Attacks and Reform
Al-Qaeda directly attacked America on September 11, 2001,
"the day that changed everything," according to CIA Director Tenet.83
President George W. Bush regarded the attack as this generation's
Pearl Harbor.84 After the 9/11 attacks, the lack of diversity in the intel-
ligence community was again identified as a problem. The Joint
Inquiry of the Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate issued
their recommendations on December 10, 2002, that included urging
the intelligence community to "enhance recruitment of a more ethni-
cally and culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to
capitalize upon the unique cultural and linguistic capabilities of first-
generation Americans . ".. 85
80. 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 2 (statement of Representative Glickman,
Chair, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
81. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Representative Glickman,
Chair, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
82. TENET & HARLOW, supra 79, at 23.
83. Id. at 161.
84. Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War: Bush's Global Strategy
Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A01,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentld=A
43708-2002Jan26.
85. Report of the U.S. Sen. Select Comm. on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence Together with Additional Views, Joint Inquiry Into
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001, S. REP. No. 107-351, H.R. REP. No. 107-79 (see page 12 of the Errata Print insert)
(Dec. 2002) [hereinafter Joint Inquiry].
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But, it was easier to issue this recommendation than to imple-
ment it. Despite post-9/11 efforts to increase intelligence diversity, it
was difficult to reverse minority underrepresentation trends.8 6 For ex-
ample in 2003, a CIA officer revealed that only "2 to 4 percent" of CIA
officers were from non-Western European ethnic groups whereas the
desired number was at least 20 percent.87 Congressional findings in
2003 stated that the intelligence community had a "significantly lower
percentage of . .. minorities than the total workforce of the Federal
government and the total civilian labor force."88 Moreover, minorities
were still underrepresented in senior-grade levels and in core mission
areas. 89
2. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Finally, in 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Acteo was passed amid the post-9/11 clamor for radical reform of
the intelligence community. The reforms included establishing a Direc-
tor of National Intelligence (DNI) to replace the CIA Director as head
of the intelligence community.91 More significantly, for diversity pur-
poses, the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act for the first time legislatively
mandates the diversification of intelligence personnel. The 2004 Act
requires the DNI to prescribe policies and programs ensuring intelli-
gence personnel are "sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection
and analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training of
women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic backgrounds." 9 2 The Act also requires the CIA director to
emphasize hiring diverse personnel to improve CIA capabilities. 93
These legislative provisions point the intelligence community towards
an integrated intelligence workforce.
86. Building Capabilities: The Intelligence Community's National Security
Requirements for Diversity of Language, Skills, and Ethnic and Cultural Understanding:
Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 108th Cong. 5 (2003)
(statement of Representative Hastings, Member, House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence) (the hearing was held Nov. 5, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 House Hearing].
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/110503hpsci.html.
87. Steve Hirsch, CIA Recruiting in High Gear, NAT'L J., Aug. 30, 2003, at 2636.
88. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177, Title III,
§ 319(a)(3), 117 Stat. 2599, 2614 (2003) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 403 note).
89. Id. at § 319(a)(4).
90. Intelligence Reform Act, supra note 3.
91. Id. § 1011(a).
92. Id. § 1011(f)(3)(A)(iv).
93. Id. § 1011.
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3. The Officer of Director of National Intelligence's Diversity Efforts
Another positive step was the ODNI's 2007 500 Day Plan for
Integration and Collaboration listing as one of its "Core Initiatives" the
following: "Treat Diversity as a Strategic Mission Imperative." 9 4 De-
spite this admonition to treat diversity as a strategic need, progress in
diversifying the intelligence community continued at a languid pace. In
a 2007 statement to the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Commu-
nity Management, one intelligence expert criticized the 500 Day Plan
because only one of seven "Enabling Initiatives" directly related to the
core initiative to treat diversity as a strategic mission imperative -
"Improve Recruiting, Hiring and Retention of Heritage Americans (1st
and 2nd Generation Americans)."9 5 Further, the 500 Day Plan pro-
vided no specifics on how to carry out this enabling initiative.9 6
Statements made by the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, Donald Kerr, to the House Subcommittee on Intelligence
Community Management only confirmed that there was inadequate
agency effort to treat diversity as a mission imperative.97 Deputy Di-
rector Kerr offered only two minor activities in support of diversity
efforts - one was holding an Intelligence Community Diversity Strat-
egy Implementation Workshop and the other was holding a Second
Affinity Group and Special Emphasis Program Leadership Collo-
quium.98 These minimal activities merely underscore the difference
between ambitious plans and actual diversity in the intelligence com-
munity.99 Merely holding a workshop and colloquium fails to fulfill the
ambitious initiative to treat diversity as a strategic mission impera-
tive. Additional action is needed to transform diversity into a strategic
exigency.
Whether the necessary actions will be undertaken by the ODNI
is an open question. Another intelligence expert providing testimony to
94. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, 500 DAY PLAN FOR INTEGRATION
AND COLLABORATION 3, 4 (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/500-day-plan.pdf.
95. Hearing on the Director of Nat'! Intelligence's 500 Day Plan: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intelligence Community Mgmt. of the House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Suzanne E. Spaulding, former General
Counsel, Senate Intelligence Comm.), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/
PDFS/spauldingl20607.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 7-8 (statement of Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of Nat'l
Intelligence, Office of Director of Nat'1 Intelligence), available at http://intelligence.house.
gov/Media/PDFS/kerrl206O7.pdf.
98. Id.
99. See Id. at 5 (statement of Tim Roemer, President, The Center for Nat' Pol'y),
available at http://intelligence.house.gov/1VIedia/PDFS/roemerl20607.pdf.
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the Subcommittee recounted his observations of how Americans
abroad created self-sufficient "Little Americas" populated by Ameri-
cans incapable of speaking the local language or blending into the local
culture.100 He further criticized the feeble post-9/11 efforts to bring
qualified Arabic language speakers into the intelligence community. 101
His prognosis on intelligence reform was pessimistic because he per-
ceived the intelligence community as "retreating into greater secrecy
and old cultural habits .... ."102
Naturally, the ODNI presents a more favorable picture. Accord-
ing to the DNI's FY 2005 Annual Report on Intelligence Community
Diversity, female and minority representation improved, especially in
the areas of new hires and promotion to senior officer positions. 103
Other positive efforts by the ODNI include retaining the Diversity Se-
nior Advisory Panel (comprised of senior officials from industry,
academia, the military, and the intelligence community) and recruiting
at national conferences sponsored by diverse organizations such as the
Hispanic Professional Engineers Association and member institutions
of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU).104
Despite these efforts, the numbers reveal minority under-
representation persists. The FBI's 2008 workforce numbers105 below
reveal that all ethnic groups (except for whites) are underrepresented




Indian Asian Black Hispanic White Islander Races
Federal Work
Force 1.64% 5.87% 18.30% 7.94% 65.39% 0.31% 0.56%
FBI 0.4% 4.1% 5.2% 7.8% 81.9% 0.0% 0.0%
100. Id. at 5 (statement of Robert L. Hutchings, Diplomat-in-Residence, Woodrow




103. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, THE US INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY'S FIVE YEAR STRATEGIC HuMAN CAPITAL PLAN 20 (2006), available at http://
www.dni.gov/DNIHumanCapitalStrategicPlanl8October2006.pdf.
104. Id. at 19-20.
105. FED BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TODAY'S FBI: WORKING FOR THE FBI, http://www.
fbi.gov/facts-and-figures/working.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
106. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT ON THE FED. WORK FORCE
FISCAL YEAR 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/reports/f sp2008/aed/tablea_1.html (last
visited Aug. 17, 2010).
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These recent 2008 FBI numbers indicate continuing minority
underrepresentation in the intelligence community. Even more re-
cently in 2009, Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
conceded that minority representation in the intelligence community
was inadequate compared to the federal workforce, the workforce at
large, and the population at large.1ov
III. THE NEED FOR DIVERSITY IN THE PRESENT
The prior section show the intelligence community was and is
not diverse. This section argues why the intelligence community
should be diverse. DIA Director Clapper stated that achieving a di-
verse workforce was "critical for doing intelligence well."1 08 CIA
Director Deutch declared that Id]iversity in our work force is critical
to the ability of the intelligence community to perform its missions in
the post-Cold War world." 1019 Current CIA Director Leon E. Panetta
averred that the "CIA relies on diversity for success.""'o A House Com-
mittee on Intelligence report described a heterogeneous intelligence
community as a "positive benefit."111 The intelligence community
should be diverse, among other reasons, because of diversity's positive
benefits. These positive benefits are examined in the following
sections.
A. The Specific Benefits of Diversity
Diversity benefits the intelligence community in numerous
ways. Although not exhaustive, the list highlights benefits specific to
intelligence agencies and provides ample reasons to diversify the intel-
ligence community.
107. Annual Threat Assessment: Hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, 111 CONG. 14 (2009) (statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director, National
Intelligence), available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090225_transcript.pdf.
108. 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 33 (statement of James R. Clapper,
Director, Def. Intelligence Agency).
109. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 3-4 (statement of John M. Deutch, Director,
Cent. Intelligence Agency).
110. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DIVERSITY AT CIA: DIRECTOR'S
STATEMENT ON OUR COMMITMENT TO DIVERSITY (April 20, 2007), https://www.cia.
gov/careers/diversity/directors-diversity-commitment.html.
111. H.R. REP. 100-591(I), at 11, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2478-79, (1988) (1988 WL
169806).
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1. Promotes Creativity
This is an important attribute in intelligence endeavors. 1 1 2 Dur-
ing congressional testimony in 1995, NSA Director J.M. McConnell
stated: "Maximizing the creativity inherent in our diversity is integral
to our mission of providing superior intelligence . . . ."113 Diversity
"adds perspectives that would otherwise be absent .... *"114 The cross-
fertilization of these added perspectives during brainstorming sessions
stimulates creative thinking.115 This is not to say that group sessions
should always replace individual thinking, but using both is optimal,
with group-derived ideas supplementing individual cogitation. 116
2. Inhibits Group-Think
Group-think occurs when group members desire group harmony
over thoughtful answers. 117 The desire to compromise and find consen-
sus rather than discuss diverse and even dissenting views results in
useless intelligence assessments that are based on the lowest common
denominator. 118 Thus, the "CIA relies on diversity for success" because
"[ilf we all think the same, failure is certain," explains CIA Director
Panetta.119 Further, group-think is not remedied by increasing the
number of intelligence agencies if the agencies are staffed by like-
minded analysts. In fact, group-think errors will only be com-
pounded. 120 Rather, the remedy is increasing the diversity of the
intelligence personnel within the intelligence agencies. This helps en-
sure genuine diversity in a pluralistic intelligence system. 1 2 1
112. RICHARD J. HEUER, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 75 (1999).
113. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 43 (statement of J.M. McConnell, Director,
Nat'1 Security Agency).
114. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 29 (2005).
115. HEUER, supra note 112, at 77.
116. Id. at 77-78.
117. DANIEL LEVI GROuP DYNAMICS FOR TEAMS 156 (2d ed. 2007).
118. JOHN J. McGONAGLE & CAROLYN M. VELLA, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO COMPETITIVE
Intelligence 145 (2003).
119. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 110 (alteration in original).
120. Steve Chan, The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic
Warning, 73 AM. POL. Sel. REV. 171, 177 (1979).
121. See Id.
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3. Mitigates Mirror-Imaging
Mirror-imaging is assuming others think like we do and act like
we would.122 Mirror-imaging is a side-effect of ethnocentrism-the
penchant to perceive the world with our rules and norms at the
center. 1 2 3 The problem of mirror-imaging has been described as the
greatest single defect in U.S. intelligence analysis accounting for mul-
tiple intelligence failures including the Cuban Missile Crisis, Pearl
Harbor, the Vietnam War, and the fall of the Shah of Iran. 124 The best,
and perhaps only, method of counteracting mirror-imaging is to employ
a culturally diverse assemblage of intelligence analysts. 125
4. Demystifies Other Cultures
According to DIA Director James R. Clapper, the United States
is far stronger with a culturally diverse intelligence workforce because
such a workforce can better "demystify foreign cultures, motivations,
and actions." 1 2 6 Representative Dicks stated that a diverse intelligence
workforce "can provide insights and understandings to basically every
ethnic and minority culture worldwide."127 Diversity helps intelligence
analysts better understand a complex, diverse world, a world that CIA
Director R. James Woolsey remarked as "far from being all or even in
the majority white male . . . .128
Rank-and-file members of the intelligence profession also real-
ize the need to understand other cultures. In an informal 2003-2004
survey of thirty-seven intelligence analysts and managers across vari-
ous intelligence agencies, a mere 3% of the respondents assessed
"language and cultural knowledge" as a "strength" within the intelli-
gence community, and 14% assessed "language and cultural and
regional understanding" as "significant weaknesses" within the intelli-
gence community. 129
122. HEUER, supra note 112, at 181.
123. CALLUM, supra note 2, at 32.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of James R. Clapper, Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency).
127. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 21 (statement of Representative Dicks,
Member, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
128. 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 11 (statement of R. James Woolsey,
Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency).
129. TREVERTON & GABBARD, supra note 15, at 10, 12.
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5. Penetrates Targets
Intelligence agents who look as though they belong can more
readily penetrate intelligence targets. CIA Director Tenet averred that
one crucial CIA imperative is to "penetrate our toughest targets
around the world," but this will not occur 'i]f all of our employees
looked like me . . . ."130 According to CIA Director Panetta, "If we all
look the same, our mission suffers."13 1
Intelligence work includes gaining access to the targeted
group, 132 but the intelligence community will fail to access hostile
groups if diversity is lacking. Such failure was evident to Senator Gra-
ham when he attended a CIA intelligence briefing in Haiti in 1987.133
Looking around, he recounted seeing people "just like me" who were
"white, middle-aged men." This prompted Senator Graham to wonder
how nondiverse intelligence agents could acquire useful intelligence in
a country where the people are 99.9% Afro-Caribbean. His answer was,
"[TIhey didn't."1 3 4
The CIA has failed to be a "first-rate spy service" as intended by
its creators, asserts Tim Weiner who wrote Legacy of Ashes: The His-
tory of the CIA that won the 2007 National Book Award. 135 To succeed,
the CIA must recruit men and women with certain attributes including
"cultural awareness and historical knowledge." 136 Moreover, advises
Weiner, they should be able to pass for Palestinians, Pakistanis, or
Pathans. 13 7
6. Increases language capabilities
Diverse intelligence personnel, especially foreign born Ameri-
cans, can provide critical language capabilities to the intelligence
community. 138 This ensures translation needs are met. But foreign lan-
guage proficiency requires more than mere translation of words and
instead also requires understanding the deeper meaning of words in
130. TENET & HARLOW, supra note 79, at 23 (alteration in original).
131. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 110.
132. ALLEN W. DULLES, THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE 58 (1963).
133. GRAHAM& NUSSBAUM, supra note 32, at 37.
134. Id. at 37-38 (alteration in original).
135. TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA xv (2007).
136. Id. at 501.
137. Id.
138. Mike McConnell, Director, Nat'l Intelligence, Remarks and Q&A by the Director of
Nat'1 Intelligence, Mr. Mike McConnell, at the 2007 Border Security Conference 5 (Aug. 14,
2007), http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20070814_speech.pdf.
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the appropriate context. 139 For example, the German terms Gemein-
schaft and Gesellschaft can be translated into English simply as
"community." But this simple translation is incomplete. To provide a
more effective translation, the intelligence analyst should understand
the deeper meaning of the terms-Gemeinschaft "community" involves
relationships in an interpersonal context whereas Gesellschaft "com-
munity" involves relationships in a business context. 140
Further, understanding the deeper meaning of terms can help
the intelligence analyst better understand target intentions and ac-
tions. 141 For example, knowing that insurgents communicate using the
language of the elite members from their culture provides class and
personal relationship information that, in turn, may provide clues to
the insurgents' behavior. 142 Such information constitutes useful intelli-
gence, and diverse personnel with foreign language capabilities
increases the chances of acquiring such information.
7. Solves Intelligence Problems
Intelligence analysis is a problem solving activity. 143 The
problems to be solved include determining when and where the next
terrorist attack will occur, understanding what the other side seeks
during arms control or trade negotiations, and knowing if other coun-
tries are complying with international treaties. 144 Research by
Professor Page (Professor of Complex Systems, Political Science, and
Economics at the University of Michigan) shows that "in problem solv-
ing, diversity is powerful stuff."1 4 5 Diversity's power is such that it
sometimes trumps ability.146 In experiments where Prof. Page formed
a random (diverse) group and a best-individual-performers group, the
first (diverse) group almost always did better.147 Although his earlier
research focused mainly on cognitive diversity, it later included iden-
tity diversity (i.e., diversity in skin color, gender, or ethnicity).148
Diversity is not a cure-all for all the ills besetting the intelligence com-
139. Moore & Krizan, supra note 11, at 117.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 116.
142. Id. at 121-22.
143. See HEUER, supra note 112, at 82.
144. See RICHELSON, supra note 6, at 10-11.
145. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATEs BETTER
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES xx (2007).
146. Id.
147. Id. at xix-xx.
148. Id. at xxi.
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munity because diversity has its limits.1 4 9 But according to Professor
Page, "[i]dentity diversity does produce benefits - not every time, not
in every context - but there is a there there."150
Also, seeking diversity does not mean sacrificing ability. This is
a false comparison that incorrectly assumes the two are like items.
However, diversity is the property of a group; ability is the property of
an individual. 15 1 These two unlike properties, rather than canceling
each other in a zero-sum dynamic, actually complement one another in
a mutually reinforcing manner.152
In sum, the seven benefits discussed above reveal how diversity
in the intelligence community enhances national security. A diverse
intelligence workforce will produce better intelligence. As stated by
CIA Director Woolsey, "[bleing able to tap a diverse work force gives
U.S. intelligence unique advantages in achieving our objectives." 153
B. The Benefits of Diversity Applied to 9/11
A heterogeneous intelligence community possessing the above-
mentioned benefits could have improved intelligence collection and
analysis efforts against al-Qaeda. But the intelligence community was
handicapped by ethnocentric biases that underestimated al-Qaeda. A
diverse intelligence workforce less prone to these biases could have
produced more accurate assessments of the al-Qaeda threat. Also, the
intelligence community was handicapped by its inability to penetrate
al-Qaeda. A diverse intelligence workforce with personnel better able
to blend into other cultures would have more likely penetrated al-
Qaeda.
1. Avoid Underestimating al-Qaeda
The failure to predict 9/11 was based in part on cultural stereo-
types that blinded the United States to the true nature of the al-Qaeda
threat.154 Although, stereotypes help us simplify a complex world, 155
they create a "we-they" dichotomy and produce a type of "group think"
149. Id. at xxiii-xxiv.
150. Id. at xxii (alteration in original).
151. Id. at xxiii.
152. See Id.
153. 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 11 (statement of R. James Woolsey,
Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency) (alteration in original).
154. See MELVIN A. GOODMAN, FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
CIA 13 (2008)..
155. Id. at 161.
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that misperceives opposing forces.156 These generalizations reduce peo-
ple to a few memorable traits 15 7 and can cause us to misperceive and
misunderstand a person or group of people. 15 8 This was the case with
al-Qaeda. As one author stated, "[W]e underestimated bin Laden's mo-
tivation, complexity, and determination."1 5 9 The "We" included the
American public, policymakers, and intelligence officials.
First, the American public underestimated al-Qaeda because in
U.S. society Arabs16c are stereotyped as, among other things, "religious
fanatics" and "oil-rich dimwits." 161 Many comedies present Arabs as
"buffoons," from Bob Hope and Bing Crosby in Road to Morocco (1942)
to Dustin Hoffman and Warren Beatty in Ishtar (1987).162 Many action
movies depict soldiers decimating "backward" desert Bedouins. 163 Such
portrayals cast Arabs as a primitive people of limited intelligence.
These pop culture stereotypes seep into the public conscious-
ness. 164 A 1980 telephone poll of 600 Americans showed 12% of the
respondents described Arabs as "Incompetent, Bungling, [and] Stu-
pid."165 Twice that much (24%) described Arabs as "Backward,
Primitive, [and] [u]ncivilized." 166 Moreover, 49% of the respondents
had a "low opinion" of Arabs while 36% had a "high opinion," and 41%
had a "low opinion" of Muslims while 39% had a "high opinion." Al-
though the numbers do not lean decisively towards one side, they do
show that more Americans have a "low opinion" rather than a "high
opinion" of Arabs and Muslims.167 These stereotypes of Arabs and
Muslims as primitive are transferred to al-Qaeda and Osama bin
Laden. As an editor from Time Magazine stated, "The view that exists
156. See Debra Merskin, The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post September 11
Discourse of George W. Bush, 7 MASS. COMM. & Soc. 157, 159 (2004).
157. Id. at 160-61.
158. See Id. at 160-61.
159. MICHAEL SCHEUER, THROUGH OUR ENEMIES' EYES: OSAMA BIN LADEN, RADICAL
ISLAM, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA xi (2003) (alteration in original).
160. Jack G. Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People, ANNALS OF
THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCIENCE 170, 173 n.1 (2003), available at http://ann.
sagepub.com/content/588/1/171 (defining "Arab" as those residing in or from the 22 Arab
states consisting of Algeria, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).
161. Id. at 172.
162. Id. at 176-77.
163. Id. at 179.
164. Id. at 176-77.
165. Shelley Slade, The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on American
Attitudes, 35 MIDDLE EAST J. 143, 147 (1981).
166. Id. (alteration in original).
167. Id. at 146.
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in the U.S. is that bin Laden is living in a cave somewhere ... ."68
These stereotypes can wend their way "into more serious matters of
national policy" crafted by policymakers. 169
Second, policymakers also underestimated al-Qaeda. They too
viewed bin Laden and his followers as primitive cave dwellers. 170 In
1997, after terrorists bombed a market in Jerusalem, Senator Robert
Torricelli expressed his outrage in declaring that "[w]herever these ter-
rorists might be hiding tonight, whatever cave may conceal their
cowardice, Israel, with America's support, would remain free." 171 In
1999, Sen. Torricelli stated, "Bin Laden in his cave in Afghanistan"
was plotting against Israel and their peace process. 172 Shortly after 9/
11, President George W. Bush stated the United States would pursue
the terrorists even though "[t]he terrorists may burrow deeper into
caves and other entrenched hiding places."173 President Bush, in 2002,
told a group of citizens that the al-Qaida terrorists were "evil people"
with a "backward, barbaric point of view." 174 In 2008 during the
Obama-McCain presidential race, former Arkansas governor Mike
Huckabee told the Republican convention attendees that presidential
candidate John McCain would protect America from terrorists by "fol-
low [ing] the fanatics to their caves in Pakistan or to the gates of
hell."175
Policymakers underestimate al-Qaeda because they cannot
bridge the cultural divide. As explained by Dalton Fury,176 Delta Force
commander who hunted Osama bin Laden, there is a cultural differ-
ence between the austere lifestyles of the average Afghani or Pashtun
versus the materialistic lifestyles of many Westerners. Osama bin
Laden lives the austere lifestyle of the average Afghani and Pashtun,
168. Bobby Ghosh, What a Top Terror Tracker Learned About Osama bin Laden, TIME
(Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1852005,00.
html.
169. Tung Yin, Through a Screen Darkly: Hollywood as a Measure of Discrimination
Against Arabs and Muslims, 2 DUKE F. FOR LAw & Soc. CHANGE 103, 104 (2010).
170. 143 CONG. REC. § 8383 (July 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Torricelli), 1997 WL
425652.
171. Id. (alteration in original).
172. 145 CONG. REC. § 10106 (Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Torricelli), 1999 WL
564478.
173. Merskin, supra note 155, at 169 (alteration in original).
174. Stewart M. Powell, Bush Exhorts Nation to Be On Guard: He Urges Involvement in
the Volunteer Citizen Corps, MILW. J. & SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 2002, at 3, 2002 WLNR 3671053.
175. Michael D. Shear, Palin Comes Out Fighting, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2008, 2008
WLNR 16686156.
176. DALTON FURY, KILL BIN LADEN: A DELTA FORCE COMMANDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE
HUNT FOR THE WORLD'S MOST WANTED MAN xxvi (2008). ("Dalton Fury" is the pseudonym
used by the Delta Force commander in his book).
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content with simple meals of flat bread and rice and the opportunity to
read the Koran. The Western mind finds it difficult to understand this
type of ascetic contentment; even more difficult is finding Western
leaders able to emulate such self-sacrifice.177
Third, intelligence officials underestimated al-Qaeda and bin
Laden. The CIA incorrectly assumed that al-Qaeda would not attack
inside the United States and the FBI incorrectly assumed that al-
Qaeda lacked the organization in the United States to do So. 1 7 8 When
asked if the United States had underestimated al-Qaeda, one FBI offi-
cial, the chief of domestic terrorism from 1996 to 1998, replied no.179
He argued instead that the United States simply lacked key intelli-
gence.s1 8 o However, this same FBI official essentially admitted to
underestimating al-Qaeda when he expressed befuddlement with al-
Qaeda's ability to successfully attack America: "This was a long-
planned operation .... I just can't understand clearly how an isolated
small group, very, very conscious of operational security, could do
this."181 Michael Sheehan, head of counterterrorism for the State De-
partment from 1998 to 2001, was also surprised by the 9/11 attacks.
According to Sheehan: "The extent of this attack is, has clearly shocked
me, and many in the community.... But this attack, and the audacity
of it, and the use of hijacked aircraft in this manner-clearly was
something we did not expect."182
2. Penetrate al-Qaeda
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community failed to
effectively use human resources to penetrate al-Qaeda. 183 CIA officials
recognized the need to penetrate al-Qaeda's leadership 84 but failed to
actually penetrate al-Qaeda, thus failing to gather actionable intelli-
gence that might have prevented 9/11.185 Senator Richard Shelby, Vice
Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, stated, "[t]he
177. Ghosh, supra note 168.
178. GOODMAN, supra note 154 at 13.
179. Frontline, Inside the Terror Network: Interview Robert M. Blitzer (interviewed Nov.
15, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/network/should/blitzer.html (last
visited Sept. 8, 2010).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Frontline, Interview: Michael Sheehan (interviewed Sept. 2001), http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/terrorismlinterviews/sheehan.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2010).
183. GRAHAM & NUSSBAUM, supra note 32, at 206.
184. Joint Inquiry, supra note 85, at 387.
185. Id. at 388.
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status quo of IC [intelligence community] approaches to human intelli-
gence (HUMINT) was tested against the Al-Qa'ida threat and [and
was] found wanting."186 The 9/11 attacks began when Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed in 1998 proposed to bin Laden a plan to use airplanes to
strike deep within the United States. Months later, bin Laden agreed.
But the United States was blind to this plan in part because it had no
human spy close enough to the terrorists to uncover the plot.18 7 The
intelligence community must hire ethnically and culturally diverse in-
telligence agents to succeed in penetrating terrorist groups.188
Admittedly, penetrating a group such as al-Qaeda is extremely
difficult because bin Laden and his inner circle of followers are linked
by kinship and combat to form a tight-knit group.189 In addition, prior
to 9/11, bin Laden and his associates lived in war-torn Afghanistan
where the United States had no official presence. 190 Notwithstanding
such difficulties, penetration of terrorist cells is possible. If the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) can put salaried American agents
in clannish narcotrafficking organizations in foreign countries, then
the CIA can learn to penetrate Islamic fundamentalist groups, asserts
Senator Shelby. 191
The exploits of Omar Nasiri also show that terrorist groups can
be penetrated. Nasiri is a Morocco-born Muslim who infiltrated Middle
East terrorist organizations and worked as a secret agent for French
and British intelligence services. His penetration of terrorist organiza-
tions provided him with information about the 9/11 attacks. He did not
personally know the 9/11 attackers, but he knew much about them.
According to Nasiri, "I know who's behind this. I know why they did it.
I know who these people are, and I know how they think."192 Nasiri
knew all of this because he successfully penetrated Middle Eastern ter-
rorist organizations. The lesson here is that U.S. intelligence agencies
can also penetrate Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. But it will
require, as author Weiner noted above, a diverse intelligence commu-
186. Senator Shelby, September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence
Community-Additional Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby Vice Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, at 12 (alteration in original).
187. TIMOTHY NAFTALI, BLIND SPOT: A SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICAN
COUNTERTERRORISM 270 (2005).
188. Shelby, supra note 186, at 12.
189. Joint Inquiry, supra note 85, at 387.
190. Id.
191. Shelby, supra note 186, at 127.
192. OMAR NAsIRI, INSIDE THE JIHAD: My LIFE WITH AL QAEDA 2 (2006).
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nity with American intelligence agents able to pass for Palestinians,
Pakistanis, or Pathans. 193
IV. SOME MEANS OF ENSURING DIVERSITY IN THE FUTURE
Diversity brings benefits, however the intelligence community
fails to maximize these benefits because of its torpid pace of reform.
Even after the 9/11 attacks, employees of color in the intelligence com-
munity are still underrepresented. No single curative remedy exists for
a diversity problem decades in the making. A multipronged approach
is necessary. Several prongs are offered below. They are more macro
(i.e., congressional oversight, statutory implementation, hiring qualifi-
cations, and educational inducements) than micro (i.e., diversity
workshops or colloquia) in their approach to providing pervasive and
enduring reform.
A. Continuing Congressional Oversight
Congressional oversight is needed to expose the hidden
problems within the intelligence agencies and to assist them in over-
coming those problems. It was Representative Stokes, chair of the
House Committee on Intelligence, who canvassed the intelligence com-
munity and uncovered the problem of minority underrepresentation
within the intelligence community. 194 He then assisted the intelligence
agencies by passing legislation authorizing intelligence agencies to set
up scholarship programs to aid in recruiting qualified minority
students. 1 9 5
Congressional oversight is also needed to pressure intelligence
agency heads to diversify their personnel. Under Representative
Stokes' leadership, the House Committee on Intelligence held hearings
on diversity within the intelligence community and these hearings con-
tinued after Stokes departed from the Committee. 196 These hearings
need to continue because of the somnambulistic pace of diversity re-
form in the intelligence community. As Representative Hastings, Vice
Chair of the House Committee on Intelligence, bluntly stated during a
2009 congressional hearing attended by the Director of National Intel-
193. WEINER, supra note 134, at 501.
194. 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 8 (statement of Representative Stokes,
former Chair, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
195. Id.
196. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 1 (statement of Representative Combest,
Chair, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
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ligence, "If I continue to see nothing but white people come in here and
nothing but men come in here, then you are going to see a continuing
harangue from me, you and everybody in the intelligence commit-
tee."197 Hastings is the first African American from Florida elected to
Congress since the post-Civil War period. 198 The oversight efforts of
Hastings and others in Congress are necessary to impel an intumes-
cent intelligence community to create a diverse workforce that can
operate effectively in a diverse world.
Intelligence agency heads also recognize the importance of con-
gressional oversight. CIA Director Woolsey, during a 1993
congressional hearing on minority underrepresentation in the intelli-
gence community, called the hearing "particularly timely" amidst a
changing world.199 DIA Director Clapper of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, during a 2003 congressional hearing on minority un-
derrepresentation, commended the committee for holding the hearing
and felt it was a "positive thing" to shine a spotlight on the diversity
problem. 2 110
B. Implementing the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004
The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 is a significant step on the
road towards diversity in the intelligence community. It is the first
piece of legislation expressly calling for an intelligence community that
is "sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of in-
telligence through the recruitment and training of women, minorities,
and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic back-
grounds."201 But this general language lacks details. More needs to be
done to transmute the 2004 Act's broad hortatory language into con-
crete action. Efforts by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and Congress reveal some of the ways the general lan-
guage of the 2004 Act can be made more concrete.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2009 is-
sued a directive promoting equal employment opportunity and
197. Annual Threat, supra note 107, at 14, (statement of Representative Hastings, Vice-
Chair, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
198. U.S. Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, Biography, http://www.alceehastings.house.
gov/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=53 (last visited Oct. 22,
2010).
199. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 3. (statement of R. James Woolsey, Director,
Cent. Intelligence Agency).
200. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 86, at 15. (statement of James R. Clapper,
Director, Nat'l Imagery and Mapping Agency).
201. Intelligence Reform Act, supra note 3, at § 1011(f)(3)(A)(iv).
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diversity (EEOD).2 0 2 The directive requires intelligence agency heads
to "demonstrate their commitment to EEOD, integrate EEOD into
their . . . strategic missions, be accountable for the management of
their EEOD programs, and develop and implement performance mea-
sures . . . ."203 The directive also establishes the Intelligence
Community EEOD Council to coordinate, evaluate, and improve equal
employment opportunity and diversity in the intelligence
community. 204
Congress has also supplied some guidelines on how to achieve
diversity in the intelligence community. A 2010 Senate bill would re-
quire the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a
report that included plans and initiatives pertaining to: (1) "recruiting
and hiring of diverse candidates, (2) "retention of diverse federal em-
ployees," (3) "diversity awareness training and education programs,"
(4) and "performance metrics."205
These recent efforts by Congress and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI) belatedly attempt to carry out the
2004 Intelligence Reform Act's mandate to diversify the intelligence
community. These efforts are worthwhile because they add teeth to the
2004 Intelligence Reform Act and can help institutionalize reform ef-
forts. However, additional efforts, as discussed in the following section,
will be needed before the Act's diversity mandate is fulfilled.
C. Providing Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications (BFOQs)
In addition to those efforts discussed above in the ODNI initia-
tive and Senate bill is providing bona fide occupational qualifications
(BFOQs) to the intelligence community. 2016 This means authorizing
identity attributes such as ethnicity and cultural background as
BFOQs. 207 Bona fide occupational qualifications are exceptions to the
statutory requirement that 'Jaill personnel actions affecting employees
or applicants for employment . . . in executive agencies . . . [be] free
from any discrimination based on race, color, . . . or national origin." 2 0 8
Thus, it is not an unlawful employment practice to hire employees "on
202. Office of the Director of Nat'l Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive No.
110, Intelligence Community Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity, B.1. (July 1,
2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/electronic reading room/ICD_110.pdf.
203. Id. at I D.2.
204. Id. at E.3.
205. S. REP. NO. 111-223, at 30 (2010), 2010 WL 2837007.
206. Shelby, supra note 186, at 128.
207. Id. at 127-28.
208. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(a) (alteration in original).
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the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain in-
stances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise . . . ."209 Federal
regulations define "national origin" to include "an individual's, or his or
her ancestor's, place of origin" in addition to an individual's "physical,
cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group."210,
The "national origin" BFOQ, then, might permit intelligence
agencies to more aggressively hire employees of color. They are needed
because understanding and penetrating terrorist organizations require
native-speaking translators, culturally-attuned analysts, and diverse
intelligence collectors able to blend into the targeted locale.21 1
Given the national security imperatives of a diverse intelligence
workforce, bona fide occupational qualifications should be authorized
not just for "national origin," but for other identity212 categories includ-
ing "race,"213 "ethnicity,"2 14 and "color."215 Adding these categories will
allow intelligence agencies maximum latitude in hiring diverse em-
ployees. Congress could add these extra categories to the present
BOFQ statute. The revised statute would state that it is not an unlaw-
ful employment practice to employ an individual "on the basis of
religion, sex, ... national origin, [race, ethnicity, or color] in those cer-
tain instances where religion, sex, . . . national origin, [race, ethnicity,
or color] is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise
"216
The national origin BFOQ provision is not the only statutory
provision that could aid intelligence agencies in ensuring a diverse
workforce. Another statutory provision, one related to national secur-
ity, states it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
not hire or to discharge an individual if the place of employment or
position sought "is subject to any [1] requirement imposed in the inter-
est of the [2] national security of the United States under any [3]
security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any [4]
209. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (The national origin BFOQ, however, is "strictly
construed"). 29 C.F.R. § 1606.4 (emphases added).
210. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1.
211. Shelby, supra note 186, at 127.
212. PAGE, supra note 145.
213. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 12.
214. Perea, supra note 10.
215. Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002).
216. The bracketed information modifies 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000oe-2(e) (alteration in
original).
78 Vol. 6:1:49
DIVERSITY IN THE AGE OF TERROR
statute of the United States," and the individual fails to meet the "re-
quirement imposed."2 1 7
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
could satisfy these four elements. First, the 2004 Act imposes a diver-
sity requirement because it states the Director of National Intelligence
"shall prescribe . . . personnel policies and programs . . . that . . . en-
sure that the personnel of the intelligence community are sufficiently
diverse . . . through the recruitment . . . of . . . minorities . . . with
diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds."2 1 8 Second, this
diversity requirement is in the interest of national security because di-
versity improves the capabilities and effectiveness of the intelligence
community. 219 Third, the 2004 Act can be considered a security pro-
gram because it seeks to secure the United States against terrorists
through a reform program for the intelligence community. Finally, the
2004 Act is a statute of the United States.
The problem with the national security provision is that it is
limited to not hiring and firing situations and fails to include hiring
situations. The provision states that "it shall not be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire [or] . . . to
discharge any individual" if there is a requirement imposed for na-
tional security reasons under a statutory security program, and the
applicant does not meet the requirement imposed.22() To correct the
hiring omission, Congress could simply add hiring language. The re-
vised national security provision would have an added section stating
"it shall also not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire any individual" if there is a requirement imposed for national
security reasons under a statutory security program, and the applicant
meets the requirement imposed. 2 2 1 The requirement imposed by the
2004 Intelligence Reform Act is ethnic and cultural diversity, and di-
verse applicants would meet this requirement.
The proposed modifications to the "national security" and "na-
tional origin" provisions will assist intelligence agencies in hiring
diverse personnel. One rejoinder, however, to hiring diverse personnel
is that they pose a greater security risk. Presumably, a first-generation
(i.e., naturalized) American with family living abroad that has tray-
217. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(g)(1)-(2) (emphases added).
218. Intelligence Reform Act, supra note 3, at § 1011(f)(3)(A)(iv) (emphasis added).
219. S. REP., supra note 205, at 30.
220. 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(g)(1)-(2) (emphases added) (alteration in original).
221. The proposed revision modifies 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(g)(1)-(2).
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elled abroad might have divided loyalties. 2 2 2 Research of 150 American
spies from 1947 to 2001 revealed that the dominant motive for becom-
ing a spy was the lure of money and not divided loyalties, and it was
revealed that more spies were native born (83%) than naturalized
American citizens (17%).223 Subsequent research into the 11 most re-
cent American spies purportedly showed reversed patterns: more were
naturalized citizens, more had foreign attachments, and divided loyal-
ties was the most common motivation. 224 Research Herbig cautions,
though, that one should consider these patterns while "[k]eeping in
mind the instability of any conclusions based on only 11 cases . . . ."225
What is conclusive, however, is espionage risks are always present
when recruiting new hires, whether they are native or foreign born.
Accordingly, foreign born Americans with their unique advantages
should be recruited.2 2 6 The past practice of screening out first genera-
tion Americans must end because those departing distant shores
seeking America have language and cultural awareness advantages
sought by U.S. intelligence agencies. 227
Foreign born and other diverse Americans should be recruited
without undue delay using bona fide occupational qualifications and
other means to establish a diverse intelligence community. Using race-
related qualifications to promote a diverse workforce has been de-
scribed as "instrumental affirmative action."2 2 8  "Instrumental
affirmative action" seeks to promote a "good thing," whereas "tradi-
tional affirmative action" sought to "rectify historical or prevent
current discrimination." 2 2 9 In the case of diversity in the intelligence
community, the "good thing" is improved intelligence. More of this
"good thing" is needed if the United States wishes to avoid another
surprise terrorist attack.
222. Scott Shane,A Spy's Motivation: For Love ofAnother Country, N.Y. TIMEs, April 20,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/weekinreview/20shane/html.
223. Katherine L. Herbig & Martin F. Wiskoff, Espionage Against the United States by
American Citizens 1947-2001, xii-xiii (July 2002), available at http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/
reports/tr02-05.pdf.
224. Katherine L. Herbig, Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007, xi-xii (March
2008), available at http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr8-05.pdf.
225. Id. at xi (alteration in original).
226. See 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 11 (statement of R. James Woolsey,
Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency).
227. McConnell, supra note 138, at 5.
228. Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action:
Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 681 (2004).
229. Id.
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D. Increasing Educational Opportunities to Students of Color
Currently, only five of the seventeen intelligence agencies have
the Undergraduate Training Program (also known as the Stokes Schol-
arship Program) - the CIA, 2 3 0 DIA, 2 3 1 NSA, 2 3 2 FBI,2 3 3 and National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 2 3 4 Diversity would likely increase if all
seventeen intelligence agencies had this recruitment program because
it targets minority youths at a young age and channels them into fu-
ture positions within the intelligence community. For example, the
NSA's undergraduate program states: "The purpose of [the program] is
to . . . facilitate the recruitment of individuals, particularly minority
high school students, with a demonstrated capability to develop skills
critical to the mission of the National Security Agency . . ."235 In prac-
tical terms, a minority college student would attend college full time
and then work at the NSA during the summer. The college student
would receive a salary while obtaining real-world experience in the in-
telligence field.2 3 6 It would be a simple task to expand this program to
all of the intelligence agencies. In fact, there is a bill to expand the
program by authorizing "other intelligence agencies to establish under-
graduate or graduate training programs . . . ."237 The bill also
authorizes the Intelligence Officer Training Program, which would pro-
vide scholarships to individuals and grants to colleges, to "help ensure
that the Intelligence Community can better recruit and retain a
workforce that is ethnically and culturally diverse . . . ."238 This bill
should be made law because recruiting students of color helps ensure a
diverse intelligence community, and this is a "good thing" that en-
hances national security.
230. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1623(a).
231. Id.
232. Nat'1 Security Agency, Opportunities for You: Stokes Educational Scholarship
Program, http://www.nsa.gov/careers/opportunities_4_u/students/stokes.shtml (last visited
Sept. 9, 2010).
233. 28 U.S.C.A. § 532 note (FBI Critical Skills Scholarship Program).
234. 10 U.S.C.A. § 462.
235. 50 U.S.C.A. § 402 note (Nat'l Security Agency Act of 1959).
236. Nat'1 Security Agency, supra note 231.
237. S. REP., supra note 205, at 10.
238. Id.
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V. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIVERSITY AND
INSIGHTS INTO U.S. SOCIETY
So far, this article has focused on the intelligence community -
the history of, need for, and steps to achieve diversity in the intelli-
gence community. But the intelligence community is a microcosm of
U.S. society, and as such, the dynamics of diversity reform within the
intelligence community can provide insights about the larger society of
which it is a part.
A. Insights on the three branches of government
The passage of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery
bestowed on Congress an affirmative role to "protect fundamental
rights throughout the nation."239 These "fundamental rights" include
equality under the law.2 4 0 In the intelligence field, Congress has at-
tempted to ensure equality prevails. Of the three branches of
government - legislative, executive, and judicial - the legislative
branch has been the most effective in encouraging equality within the
intelligence community. As chair of the House Committee on Intelli-
gence, Representative Stokes used his oversight authority to focus on
diversity reform in the intelligence community. Other congressional
members who followed also maintained this focus including Represent-
atives Julian Dixon, Nancy Pelosi, Tim Roemer, and Sherwood
Boehlert.24 1 The congressional spotlight on diversity prompted the in-
telligence community to undertake efforts to address its minority
underrepresentation problem.242
The executive branch is not well placed to reform the intelli-
gence community because allowing executive branch agencies to
reform themselves is akin to letting the "fox guard the henhouse." 2 4 3
Intelligence agencies tend towards secrecy and thus resist change that
might lift the veil of secrecy, especially if the resulting exposure might
reveal embarrassing internal deficiencies. 2 4 4 In the matter of diversity,
239. Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1938
(1987).
240. Id. at 1938-39.
241. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 86, at 4 (statement of Representative Hastings,
Member, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence).
242. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 2 (statement of Representative Combest,
Chair, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence).
243. See 150 CONG. REC. S8538 (daily ed. July 21, 2004) (statement of Senator
Graham), 2004 WL 1630366.
244. Id.
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the intelligence community has been deficient for decades in address-
ing the problem of minority underrepresentation within its ranks.
The judicial branch is also not well placed to reform the intelli-
gence community. Courts are incapable of instituting wholesale reform
because they are limited to addressing only issues brought before them
by the litigants. 245 Further, courts are limited by the state secrets priv-
ilege which is a "common law evidentiary rule that allows the
government to withhold information from discovery when disclosure
would be inimical to national security."2 4 6 An intelligence agency could
use the state secrets privilege to halt a minority employee's discrimina-
tion lawsuit. This occurred in the case of Jeffrey Sterling, a black CIA
agent who sued the CIA for racial discrimination in 2001. He was an
Operations Officer in the Near East and South Asia division from 1993
to 2001. He alleged being denied advantageous opportunities, being
provided with more rigorous requirements, and subjected to disparate
treatment because he was African American. 247 The Fourth Circuit
dismissed his lawsuit because proof of racial discrimination "would re-
quire inquiry into state secrets such as the operational objectives and
long-term missions of different agents . . . and the organizational struc-
ture of CIA intelligence-gathering." 248
Congress, then, is best situated to advance diversity in the in-
telligence community and has consistently done so in recent decades.
Congress should be credited with pushing the intelligence community
- arguably the last federal enclave of racial homogeneity - towards
greater diversity. However, public perception of Congress is hardly
favorable. A 2010 Gallup Poll questioning Americans on their confi-
dence in sixteen U.S. institutions placed Congress at the very bottom,
even lower than Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). 2 4 9 This is
regrettable because for all the imperfections of Congress, it remains a
co-equal third branch of government with critical oversight func-
tions.250 Congressional oversight of the intelligence community has
made it more diverse and thus more effective in protecting the Ameri-
can public, the same public that ironically holds Congress in such low
regard.
245. Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514, 521 (3d Cir. 1948).
246. Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991).
247. Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 2005).
248. Id. at 348.
249. Gallup, Congress Ranks Last in Confidence in Institutions, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/141512/congress-ranks-last-confidence-institutions.aspx#1 (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
250. MARTIN 0. JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 5-6 (2002).
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B. Insights on the Ongoing Quest For Equality
The quest for equality in America has been and continues to be
a struggle because of white backlash.25 1 This is no less true in the in-
telligence community. DIA Director Clapper provided congressional
testimony on white males in the DIA who criticized diversity initia-
tives and complained of being disenfranchised and not being promoted
on merit.2 5 2 In one instance, after Director Clapper reprimanded a DIA
employee for sending an ethnically disparaging joke through email, a
DIA employee wrote to The Washington Times the following: "Don't
you think with the looming crisis in North Korea that the director of
the DIA (a three-star general) would have more important things to
worry about than scanning the electronic mail for nasty little jokes?" 2 5 3
The quest for equality is a struggle not only because of backlash
by those who oppose diversity efforts, but also because of ambivalence
from even those who support such efforts. The ambivalence of those
who argue for a diverse intelligence community can be detected in their
statements seeking to justify diversity on practical as well as princi-
pled grounds. CIA Director Woolsey shared, "I believe that this goal [of
equality] is important not only in the interest of fairness, but because
as intelligence agencies it enables us to do our jobs better as well." 2 5 4
DIA Director Clapper asserted, "[d]iversity is just plain right; and ... it
is critical for doing intelligence well." 2 5 5 Representative Michael N.
Castle opined, "[i]t seems to me that this [effort to diversify the CIA] is
not just an issue of legal diversity or of dealing with . . . racial issues,
but an issue of ability to carry out your business in the best way
possible."256
These statements show ambivalence towards diversity because
they reveal a lack of confidence in justifying diversity solely on princi-
ple. Instead of arguing for diversity based solely on the principle of
equality, these statements express a felt need to shore up the princi-
pled equality rationale with the practical security rationale. These
statements reveal a perception that although diversity efforts have
251. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 529 (3d ed. 2007).
252. 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 35 (statement of James R. Clapper,
Director, Def. Intelligence Agency).
253. Id. at 35, 59-60.
254. Id. at 11 (statement of R. James Woolsey, Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency)
(emphases added) (alteration in original).
255. 1994 House Hearing, supra note 47, at 33 (statement of James R. Clapper,
Director, Def. Intelligence Agency) (emphases added) (alteration in original).
256. 1995 House Hearing, supra note 8, at 22 (statement of Representative Castle,
Member, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence) (emphases added).
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sprouted roots, the roots are not deep. To deepen the roots, an appeal is
made to people's self-interest by telling them that diversity is practical
because it produces better intelligence that can better protect
Americans.
Other statements do more than promote the practical rationale
- they also diminish the principled rationale. CIA Director Tenet in-
structed, "Forget for a moment the ethical reason for diversity. More
than any other entity, the intelligence community has a business need
to have its workforce reflect a broad cross section of our populace." 257
Senator Shelby contended, "I do not believe the language in the Joint
Inquiry's 'Recommendations' concerning [the recruitment of diverse
personnel] is meant to represent our collective endorsement of work-
place diversity for its own sake. 2 5 8 Instead, Senator Shelby elaborated,
the objective is "understanding and penetrating international terrorist
organizations . . . ."259 Miguel Diaz of the Center for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies expressed, "[flirst, we should encourage diversity
within the Intelligence Community because it is the right thing to
do.... Second, and perhaps more importantly, we should pursue diver-
sity within the intelligence community because it is the smart thing to
do."2 60
These statements, though inadvertent, effectively downgrade
the principle of equality. This principle is intrinsically valuable and it
should not be forgotten, but it should be pursued for its own sake and
should not be considered less important. No doubt, arguing the practi-
cal effects of diversity is persuasive in a time of war. Moreover, it is
true that both practical and principled justifications exist for diversity,
and the practical justification should elaborate further to inform those
unaware of this aspect of diversity. The danger, however, is in elevat-
ing the practical justification at the expense of the principled
justification. Diversity efforts should not be undertaken only during
wartime or when there is a practical need for a pluralistic population to
defend the state. Rather, equality should be pursued for its own sake,
257. TENET & HARLOW, supra note 79, at 23 (emphasis added).
258. Shelby, supra note 185, at 127 (author's comment for clarity).
259. Id.
260. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 86, at 66-67 (statement of Miguel Diaz, Director of
South America Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies) (emphases added)
(alteration in original).
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whether in wartime or peacetime, 2 6 1 because people are not means but
are ends unto themselves. 2 6 2
C. Insights on a Wartime Paradox
Times of war are paradoxical in that they produce both racial
division and integration. 263 For example, during World War II, there
was racial division as seen in the internment of Japanese Ameri-
cans. 2 6 4 But, there was also the admission of blacks, Japanese
Americans, and other minorities into the military during World War
11,265 and integration or minorities in the military continued during
the Korean War.266 Racial integration in the armed forces helped pave
the way for wider racial integration within U.S. society.267
Likewise, during the current War on Terror, there is racial divi-
sion in the racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims and in the calls to seal
the border against "illegal aliens."268 But, there is also integration as
seen in the statements of intelligence agency heads arguing for diver-
sity in the intelligence agencies and in the express language of the
2004 Intelligence Reform Act prescribing a diverse intelligence commu-
nity. As the intelligence community becomes more diverse,
consequently U.S. society (of which the intelligence community is a
part) becomes more diverse. The historical process of increased societal
integration through wartime integration of the military now continues
through wartime integration of the intelligence community.
This does not mean the United States should seek war as a
means to further domestic diversity goals. As stated by Colin Powell,
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "[wiar is a deadly game"
and "American GIs [are] not toy soldiers to be moved around on some
261. See Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227,
232 (1972).
262. See Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach
to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 312 (2003).
263. Anson Phelps Stokes, American Race Relations in War Time, 14 J. NEGRO EDUC.
535, 535 (1945).
264. Seth Haines, Rounding up the Usual Suspects: The Rights of Arab Detainees in a
Post-September 11 World, 57 ARK. L. REV. 105, 105-06 (2004).
265. Melissa Murray, When War is Work: The G.I. Bill, Citizenship, and the Civic
Generation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 967, 984 (2008).
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sort of global game board."269 Nonetheless, wars will occur, and when
they do, we should comprehend that there is both peril and promise
during wartime. We comprehend the peril of war-induced discrimina-
tion to better guard against it, and the promise of increased integration
to better further it along.
VI. CONCLUSION
The principle of racial equality is more fully realized when all
segments of U.S. society are part of the equality effort. As the intelli-
gence community segment becomes more diverse and heterogeneous,
the principle of racial equality becomes more fully realized. A long his-
tory of minority underrepresentation in the intelligence community
need not present an insurmountable obstacle to this realization. Con-
gressional oversight, the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, and
intelligence agency initiatives all contribute to the diversity that will
lead to the removal of the homogeneity handicap.
Moreover, equality and diversity in the intelligence community
is achievable because Americans of color do desire to serve their coun-
try in times of war. They have done so since the colonial period 2 701 and
should be equally able to do so now in all fields including those in the
intelligence community. Lowering barriers to the intelligence field will
better achieve equality and better defend America. A better defended
America is not the sine qua non for racial equality, but in war where all
Americans are at risk, all Americans should be given an equal opportu-
nity to share the privilege and burden of serving their country at the
"tip of the spear."271
Robert Callum predicted that the intelligence community might
find diversity thrust upon it in the wake of failure. He also warned that
if ethnocentrism and homogeneity persist, future intelligence failures
are assured. 2 7 2 What must be done, then, is to displace ethnocentrism
with equality, and homogeneity with heterogeneity. Voices within and
without the intelligence community say this must be done. It remains
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only to do what must be done. When done, the principle of equality will
be more fully affirmed and the protection of the citizenry will be more
fully achieved.
